HUME, MIRACLES, AND MATHEMATICS:
A CASE STUDY FOR THE USE AND PREVALENCE
OF PROBABILISTIC ARGUMENTATION
WITHIN BIBLICAL STUDIES

Joshua Brickell
In David Hume's Enquiry, he states: "No testimony is
sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of
such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than
the fact, which it endeavours to establish... the superior only
gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which
remains, after deducting the inferior."1 Hume's statement may
seem captive to the realm of philosophy. One could discuss
how Hume eventually dismisses the existence of miracles not
because he sees them as theoretically impossible, but rather
because no witness could ever be reliable enough to show otherwise. But as Holder, Sobel,2 Owen,3 and others argue,
Hume's statement is inherently mathematical. While these
scholars have differing opinions as to whether miracles exist
or not, all interpret Hume's statement in light of Bayes' theorem, a statistical technique developed by Thomas Bayes. In
this paper, I will analyze the debate about Hume and miracles,
arguing that under certain conditions the existence of a miracle
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could be rationally accepted. This discussion about Hume will
serve as a case study, showing how mathematics and specifically probability can be integral to analyzing important questions present in philosophy and religion. I will then explore
more broadly the realm of biblical studies, arguing that biblical historians frequently employ probabilistic argumentation
and mathematical reasoning when assessing the truthfulness
of biblical narratives. Finally, I will suggest that given the case
study about miracles and the commonplace of probabilistic
language in biblical studies, having a degree of mathematical
literacy can be a useful and important tool in dissecting the
arguments made by biblical historians today.
Hume and Bayes' Theorem
In Rodney Holder's article on Hume and miracles, he
interprets Hume's statement above to be making an argument
that draws upon the logic of Bayesian probabilities. Here,
Hume brings up two significant probabilities: the probability
of a witness making false testimony, and the a priori probability of a miracle occurring. Seeing the probabilities that Hume
has stressed in his analysis, Holder uses Bayes' Theorem to
mathematically express Hume's argument. Bayes' Theorem is
a statistical technique that combines the use of a priori and
conditional probabilities4 in order to assess the likelihood of
the event in question. In this case, the central event in question
is this: what is the probability of a specific miracle having occurred (denoted by the variable "M" in the formulas to follow),
given an individual's testimony to that specific miracle occurring (denoted "T"). Using these variables, Bayes' Theorem is
as follows, where P(T | M) is the conditional probability that
testimony would be provided given that the miracle occurred,
and P(T | ~M) is the conditional probability that an individual
4

A conditional probability is the probability of event A occurring
given that event B occurred and is denoted P(A|B).
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would provide testimony to the miracle occurring given that
the miracle did not actually occur:
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Since Hume argues that miracles are intrinsically improbable,
the P(M) << 1 (a really small number), and the P(~M)=1 (technically, very close to 1). If the miracle occurs and someone is
there to see it, it is almost certain that it will get reported, so
P(T|M) = 1. Using Hume’s assumptions and inserting these
values, the following is left:
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(Eq. 2)

Holder argues that for a miracle to be "rationally acceptable"5
the probability of the miracle occurring given the testimony
about that miracle must be greater than 0.5. Using the equation
above, this means we are looking for what is greater, the a priori probability that the miracle occurred, or the probability that
the witness testified to the specific miracle occurring, given
that the miracle did not actually occur. Mathematically expressed:

(Eq. 3)
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Notice this is exactly where Hume left us, comparing the probabilities of a miraculous event to the conditional probability of
false testimony.
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Now that the basics of Bayes’ Theorem have been laid
out, in order to assess whether or not Hume’s intuition and arguments against miracles hold weight when expressed mathematically, we must explore the assumptions and simplifications used by later scholars who agree and disagree with
Hume’s analysis. Owen, in his article assessing Hume’s argument and its Bayesian interpretation, makes some assumptions
that cause him to diverge from Holder. Owen of course holds
to the basic Bayes’ Theorem presented in equation 1 above.
However, he then proceeds to use a simplification of equation
1 in his analysis of Hume’s arguments:6

(Eq. 4)
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Note the only difference here between Holder and Owen is that
Owen replaces ! ($ I~" ) with (1 − ! ($ I" )). Owen notes
that these two expressions are equal so long as ! ($ I" ) =
!(~$|~"), where the last conditional probability means that
the witness testified to any event other than event M, given
that event M did not occur. As will be seen later, whether or
not one accepts this as a justifiable becomes crucial in determining whether or not Hume's logic makes sense mathematically.
The issue with Owen's logic here is his assumption regarding the equality above. The variable T refers to a witness
testifying that the specific event M occurred. So then, the negation of this statement, ~T, here refers to the same witness
6

To keep mathematical notation consistent throughout this paper, I
have translated Owen’s notation into the notation already expressed
by Holder. Owen uses the notation as follows:
H5
=
H5 + (1 − H)(1 − 5)
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making a testimony about some other event occurring. This
could be any number of possible events, so long as the testimony is not about event M occurring. Thus, the event ~$ ∩
~" (meaning not T and not M) would include any possible
scenarios where the witness testifies about an event other than
M (or perhaps does not testify at all), and M does not actually
occur. For example, say event A actually occurred, and the
witness testified that event B occurred (the witness did not accurately report what happened). This scenario would be consistent with the expression ~$ ∩ ~", as would a scenario
where event A actually occurred, and the witness testified that
event A actually occurred (the witness accurately reported
what happened). How does this compare to the event $ ∩ "?
The only scenario consistent with this expression is the scenario where the witness testifies that event M occurred, and
event M did occur. Given the disparity between the number of
compatible scenarios with each of these events, it would be
$ I" ) = !(~$|~"). Given this,
incredibly unlikely that ! C
why does Owen make this error? If we are being sympathetic
to Owen here, it appears that he means that the probability that
the witness would testify to event M giving that M occurred
should be equal to the probability that the witness would testify to a different event, say event A, given that event A actually occurred. Holder argues along a similar vein when noting
his difference with Owen, saying that by being more careful
with formulating the language used in describing the variables,
the matter cannot be simplified the way Owen does.7 It is important to stress here that Holder and Owen are not doing
vastly different math: their approaches to this problem are
quite similar. Rather, Holder is a bit more precise in how he
defines his terms, and this leads to him rejecting one assumption that Owen makes.
7
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As has already been shown, Holder disagrees with the
way Owen simplifies !($|~"). Holder's logic centers around
how he defines his terms: "our background knowledge K is
that W [the witness] is in a position to make a report on what
occurs and does so. T is, specifically a testimony for M, i.e.
'W states the M occurred'. But given that M did not occur there
are many ways for W [the witness] to give a false report... and
it is most unlikely that the false report W would come up with
is M."8 This leads Holder to provide the following formula:9

(Eq. 5)
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= (1 − 5) ∗ (1/1)

Again it must be stressed that the difference between Holder
and Owen is small. All Holder does is recognize that if the
witness were to give a false report, there are other possible
false reports other than the exact event M. While the difference
in their assumptions is small, this can produce a large effect
on the end results. Factoring Holder's assumption into equation 2 and rearranging terms we have the following:

(Eq. 6)
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n here is the endless numbers of false reports that one could
choose from.
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Now Holder assumes that n would be sufficiently large, suggesting that there are a multitude of false reports to choose
from. However, Holder's argument goes too far here, as it
would be more likely that there are only a couple other explanations that one could be reasonably expected to testify to. For
example, if one saw a healing and testified to a miracle occurring, there would be a couple other ways to possibly testify
about the event: the work of a particular medicine, or the care
of a doctor. So for our case, n would be greater than 1, but not
very large. Even with this adjustment to Holder's argument, he
still seems to have supplied a way in which one could rationally accept that a miracle has occurred. This is not the same as
saying that Holder has proved that a particular miracle has occurred, or that this formula could determine if a specific event
was a miracle. Rather, it is a response to Hume's earlier statement from his Enquiry, that in certain cases it may be rational
to accept the existence of a miracle based on witness testimony.
Objections to Hume and the use of Bayesian Statistics
So far our discussion around Hume's argument against
miracles is that using a formula like Bayes' theorem, centered
around the idea of conditional probability, is an appropriate
way to measure the reliability of testimony and the probability
of a miracle (or any other event) occurring. While on different
sides of the debate as to whether Hume was correct, Owen
and Holder both agree that interpreting Hume in a Bayesian
manner is appropriate, and that using prior probabilities in assessing the likelihood of a particular occurrence is a valid approach. However, there are some who have questioned the
logic of using prior probabilities in assessing the reliability of
witness testimony. In this next section, the thoughts of Richard
Price, an eighteenth century mathematician, and David Cohen,
a twentieth century philosopher, will be explored. Both Cohen
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and Price offer arguments as to why this probabilistic reasoning is an inappropriate way to measure things such as witness
reliability. Furthermore, Cohen and Price show how this topic
has implications far beyond the field of miracles, affecting
things such as the reliability of a courtroom witness to the reliability of medical tests for diseases. Finally, we will examine
the objections brought by Sobel, who argues that there are
some limitations to Bayes' theorem, and provides examples
where our intuition may show Bayes' theorem to not be entirely reasonable.
Sobel quotes Price as saying that, "the turning point in
Mr. Hume's argument is... the principle, that no testimony
should engage our belief, except the improbability in the falsehood of it is greater than that in the event which it attests... he
[Price] maintains 'that improbabilities as such do not lessen the
capacity of testimony to report truth."10 Price provides a number of examples to show his case. His cases can generally be
characterized as examples that appeal to our intuition, where
we might be led to believe a trustworthy source despite the fact
that there are long odds that the event being reported would
actually occur. For example, Price provides the example of a
newspaper that is generally accurate two out of every three
times. This newspaper one day "reported the loss of a ferry
boat during a crossing it had previously made safely two thousand times. In this case, Price asserts, "testimony that is accurate only two out of three times would overcome odds of thousands to one against."11 In addition, Price offers another reason

10

Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 177, quoting Richard
Price's 4th dissertation.
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David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 194.
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that prior probabilities should not usually be relevant. Owen
attempts to sympathetically give the case for Price's second
argument as follows: "One could argue that the likelihood of
the event reported, or the distribution of past occurrences or
non-occurrences, is independent of the accuracy of the testimony, so that when we are to consider whether or not to believe testimony, only its accuracy should be taken into account."12
Owen also examines the arguments of a more recent
philosopher, L.J. Cohen. Cohen comes to similar conclusions
that Price does, but along a slightly different vein. Cohen will
accept the use of prior probabilities and conditional statements
when discussing the case of long term frequencies of a certain
event, just like Hume. But if the concern is with the likelihood
of one particular instance of an event occurring, the prior probabilities should be ignored.13 This has some quite practical implications. Say one is experiencing health symptoms indicating that he or she has either disease A or B.14 For every 20
people experiencing symptoms, 19 have A and 1 has B. We
also know that the test is 80% accurate. Cohen might want to
point out that if one was to use Bayes' theorem the probability

Another example with the same newspaper is given, where 9
highly improbable events occur. Price alleges that Hume's probabilistic reasoning would lead us to believe none, despite the fact that
with 9 events and a fairly accurate newspaper, it seems reasonable
to think that we ought to believe some of them!
12
David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 195. Owen claims that Price's
original argument does not mount much of a challenge to Hume,
and so reformulates it in a way that provides a stronger attack
against Hume's position.
13
David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 196.
14
See Cohen describe this example on p. 196-198
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that one actually has disease B, given that a B test result is
provided, is only 17.39%.15

(Eq. 7)
! (ℎ4?6 2076476 O H>7050?6 O 5675 ) =

.QR∗.RS
.QR∗.RS*.TS∗.UR

= 17.39%

If it is true that given a positive B test, there is only a 17.39%
chance of actually having the B disease, then many might turn
to wonder and ask, what is the point of taking the test at all?
But if we ignored the prior probabilities when assessing the chance that one particular individual has the disease, then we might decide to trust the results of the test. Owen
describes how this is not simply a matter of academic debate,
but has important applications: "suppose that the likelihood of
a nuclear attack is one in a thousand, but that the accuracy of
one's radar or other early warning devices is only about 99.8%.
Would it be rational to act on the information given by one's
equipment, or more rational not to set up such warning devices
at all?"16
Owen's response to Price and Cohen's objections centers around the need for specificity of language. Recall the
medical test, where the test is accurate 80% of the time. What
does 80% of the time mean? If it means that looking at the
subset of the population who have disease B, the test is correct
80% of the time, then we will get the surprising result above,
where even if one tests positive for disease B, using Bayes'
15

How we interpret the statement "accurate 80% of the time" really
affects how this is calculated. This will be explored in the next section on precision of language. Also, this is meant purely as a hypothetical example, and is not an attempt to say that medical tests for
diseases are not accurate enough to be worth taking.
16
David Owen, "Hume Versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities: Testimony and the Bayesian Calculation." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 197.
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theorem it would not make sense to trust the results of the test.
But, what if 80% accuracy meant that if one tested positive for
disease B, one had an 80% chance of actually having disease
B? Well this would drastically change one's thinking, and if an
individual tested positive for disease B, it would be quite logical to trust the results of the test! Where Cohen has confused
his readers with his disease example is that he has been ambiguous with language that could cause one to mistake the
value for the !(ℎ4?6 O|5675 H>7050?6 :>< O) conditional
with the !(5675 H>7050?6 :>< O|ℎ4?6 O). What we are looking for in the final answer is former, but the example presents
the 80% as if it should be final answer intuitively, and then
uses the .8 figure as the latter probability in erroneously calculating Bayes' Theorem. Owen provides sufficient explanations
to the rest of Price and Cohen's objections, which center
around the same idea of ambiguous language. Owen is not
providing a math lesson here: rather, the point to be made is
linguistic. When using variations of the terms credible, reliable, and accurate, we must be acutely aware of and careful to
define what those terms mean. A lack of specificity of language here creates the confusion highlighted in our previous
examples.
Another interesting possible objection made against
Hume/Bayesian probabilities comes from Sobel. in his reaction to the important work of Tversky and Kahneman.17
Tversky and Kahneman give an experiment where they tell the
following story: 85 taxicabs in a town are green, and the other
15 are blue. One taxicab is in an accident at night, where a
witness, who can correctly identify the color 80% of the time,
has identified the taxicab as blue. Kahneman and Tversky ask
their subjects, what is the probability that the taxicab in the
17

he is specifically citing their 1977 work, "Casual Thinking in
Judgment under Uncertainty." Tversky and Kahneman here say that
there taxicab experiments imply that people are irrational in their
decision making. Sobel provides another possible way to tell the
story of the results of their experiments.
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accident was blue? The median response in their experiment
was that there is an 80% chance that the cab is blue. Respondents to this scenario had no intuitive idea of Bayes' Theorem
and conditional probability, and "when updating initial probabilities for the taxicab's being blue, these subjects in fact ignored them and set them aside."18 If the experiment ended
here, it would be no more than a real life example of an experiment almost identical to the hypotheticals concerning newspapers and disease testing above. But, Tversky and Kahneman
take things one step farther: they do the exact same experiment, except instead of telling respondents that 85% of cabs
are green and 15% are blue, they say that 85% of cabs involved
in accidents are green and 15% of cabs involved in accidents
are blue, providing no information as to the general percentage
of taxicabs in the city. Given the same question as before,
these subjects respond much differently than those told about
the general ratio of taxicabs, as the median response is that
there is a 55% chance that the taxicab was actually blue. In
either scenario, if the subjects had responded by using Bayes'
theorem, all would have answered 41%, which is much closer
to the answer given by the second group of respondents. The
typical response to this experiment might be that it shows how
people's intuition is irrational and does not line up with the
math. But, another explanation is that the Bayesian formulation we have been using might not be as robust as originally
thought. In this experiment, which is a stronger piece of evidence that the specific taxicab in the accident might not actually be blue: 85% of cabs in the city are green, or 85% of cabs
involved in accidents in the city are green? The latter, as it
provides an additional piece of relevant information. If we
only knew the former, and were then asked the expected ratio
of blue to green cabs in accidents, 41% would be the correct

18

Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 182.
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answer. But the actual ratio in question will have some variation from our expected value. This means that using Bayes'
theorem to find the results in both scenarios will lead to an
accurate answer, in that in both scenarios the calculations will
have been done correctly in accordance with the data given.
Where these two scenarios differ is in their precision: scenario
two has more detailed information and therefore we should
have a higher level of confidence in them. To put another way,
both Bayesian formulations give us a 41% chance that the cab
is actually blue, but we can trust the 41% figure in scenario
two more than we can trust the 41% figure in scenario one.
Note also that in both scenarios, we did not change the reliability of the witness to the crash: the variance in confidence
we have in our answer is so far due to completely to the difference in the quality of other prior evidence.
Sobel has a similar argument here. In his assessment
that normal Bayesian probabilities may not always accurately
reflect the situation at hand, he imagines how a perfectly rational being who is limited in data and capacities but logically
omniscient in that he or she is quite certain of every logical
necessity might assess the total credence-state of a particular
problem.19 "The main thing to say is that it might be better
represented by a many-membered set of probability functions
than by any single probability functions."20 A Bayesian probability function might be a member of this set of functions, but
not the only one used. These functions would then be combined into singular probabilities, which would be a sort of
weighted average based on the accuracy and precision of the
data available. These singular probabilities could be described
by their quantities and qualities. The quantities are easy
19

Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 183.
20
Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 183.
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enough to describe, as the end results from the calculation, for
the example the 41% probability derived previously. Qualities,
"would correspond to what some might term the 'weights' or
'degrees of ambiguity' of evidential bases for propositions, and
to the confidence a person had in his various 'singular probabilities', displayed perhaps in his readiness to accept bets based
on them."21 In Tversky and Kahneman's example, I am more
likely to place bets based on the second scenario rather than
the first, despite the fact that both Bayesian probabilities are
the same.
What conclusions can we draw from these objections
to Hume and Bayesian probabilistic thinking? We can certainly see that we must certainly be careful in our language,
and that terms such as reliability, credibility, and accuracy can
mean different things depending on their context. In Owen's
example, if a test is advertised as 80% accurate, does that mean
that considering those who have the disease the "test is right
80% of the time," or does it mean that considering those whom
the test indicates as having the disease, "it is right 80% of the
time?"22 As we have seen, these two statements mean drastically different things. By following Owen's lead, recognizing
and clearing up some of the ambiguity in our language, it is
fair to say that Price and Cohen's main objections to Hume and
Bayes can be accounted for. While being more careful in our
language can alleviate us from the objections of Price and Cohen, Sobel's critique is more interesting. Sobel does not claim
that Bayesian statistics provide wrong or inaccurate results to
a situation at hand; rather, he illustrates that Bayes' Theorem,

21

Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony
for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 184.
22
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while a good tool to use, is limited in its ability to assess the
quality23 of the evidence at hand.
Revisiting Miracles in Light of Sobel's Objection
Earlier, I concluded that given Holder and Owen's
work interpreting Hume's statements on miracles in ways consistent with Bayes' theorem, Hume misses the mark on denying the existence of miracles based on probabilities, and that
there could be cases where it may be reasonable to believe that
a miracle has occurred. And while Sobel's argument using just
Bayes' theorem is nearly identical and reaches the same conclusion as Owen, Sobel's argument that Bayes' theorem may
not be all we need to look at when considering evidence of
prior probabilities could be a strong counter to Holder and is
essential to this discussion. When Sobel applies his additional
argument to the miracle situation, he claims that that an individual's singular priors for and against miracles will be of the
highest qualities. As he says, "probabilities averaged of such
miracles, given their unambiguous inconsistency with what
one takes to be the natural and necessary order of nature, will
be concentrated closely around the average value."24 Sobel is
saying that the argument against miracles is like the second
taxicab scenario, in that the quality of evidence (related to the
prior probability that miracles are highly improbable) is extremely high. He claims that, "it is not that probabilities for
miracles are apt to be of extraordinarily low and infinitesimal

23

As Jordan Howard Sobel defines it, described previously in relation to confidence levels or the precision of the data at hand.
24
Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 184.
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quantities, but that they are apt to be extraordinarily 'concentrated' and 'focused', and of highest quality."25 This last statement summarizes the key assumption in Sobel's argument. He
does believe that the probability of a miracle is low; but his
primary argument here is that one should have a high degree
of confidence in this low probability.
Sobel's arguments about confidence levels in prior
probabilities are not specifically addressed by Holder. However interestingly enough, Holder does provide different examples of scenarios where we may be able to have more confidence in support of a result that provides evidence for the
reasonability of a miracle. Holder's additional arguments center around the difference between individual and multiple independent testimony. It is intuitive that if there were two people who independently testified to the occurrence of event M,
then to use Sobel's terms both the quantity and quality of the
resulting probability would be higher. The higher quality of
this singular probability can be explained as being akin to a
larger sample size in a poll. Having a poll with 500 people is
going to create a result that has lower variance than a poll
showing the same result but with only 100 people. Both
Holder and Sobel's additional arguments, beyond the basics of
explaining Bayes' theorem, center around the quality of the evidence and the confidence level one would apply to the final
probability. Unfortunately, their arguments here sidestep each
other. One could perhaps rebut Sobel, claiming that he is making a huge assumption about the extremely high quality of a
singular prior of a miracle occurring. Sobel does not give
much justification for this assumption, other than saying that
we all know that miracles do not occur, therefore the quality
of our prior evidence against miracles is high. But in a discussion where Sobel's conclusion is that belief in a miracle is not
reasonable, it would seem circular to suggest that the evidence
25

Jordan Howard Sobel, "On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis." The
Philosophical Quarterly 37, no 147 (1987): 185.
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for this is that we know miracles do not occur. On the other
side, one could take issue with Holder by claiming that he creates a very neat and clean world in order to perform his mathematical analysis. For example, Holder assumes a highly reliable and trustworthy witness; how do we know if this
condition is fulfilled in the real world? Furthermore, Holder
assumes independent multiple testimony; it is an open question how often this condition could actually be fulfilled. All in
all, my earlier assertion that given Hume's formulation, we
should disagree with him and leave open the option that there
could be cases where we could reasonably believe in the existence of a miracle, still holds weight given these additional
arguments. However, the further arguments of multiple independent testimony and the quality of singular priors present
quite a challenging situation to analyze. Needless to say, there
is much room for further research and analysis on these two
advancements of the argument beyond the basic Bayesian formula.
Probabilistic Language in Biblical Studies
So far, we have examined David Hume's probabilistic
argument against the existence of miracles, and responses
from modern day mathematicians and philosophers on both
sides who use Bayes' theorem as the foundation for their argument in support of or against Hume. Overall, Holder's argument using Bayes' theorem is convincing, and should be seen
as strong evidence that there could be cases where belief in the
occurrence of a miracle is rational. However, given Sobel and
Holder's arguments that go beyond the scope of the basic
Bayesian formulation, the waters become muddied, and I have
no tidy conclusion to offer. But, the purpose of this paper is
not to prove Hume right or wrong; rather, it is to use the debate
around Hume's argument as a case study for how scholars
across disciplines integrate mathematical language and concepts into arguments that may at first glance seem to have
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nothing to do with math at all. If convinced of this, a few questions no doubt arise. First, why do scholars use this sort of language? Second, is probabilistic or mathematical reasoning an
appropriate way to evaluate truth claims in the humanities? In
the natural sciences the scientific method and statistical evaluation certainly dominate in the quest for truth. (although I
would argue the conclusions drawn from the data involve a
certain amount of storytelling as well) So is expressing arguments couched in probabilities and conditionals the humanities version of the scientific method? And finally, do scholars'
probabilistic statements make sense when expressed mathematically? In this concluding section, I will zoom in on the
field of biblical studies, to provide some examples of this sort
of language being used and analyze the role it plays in developing arguments.
In discussing how biblical historians assess the historical truth of events in the bible, Bart Ehrman states that, "Historians more or less rank past events on the basis of the relative
probability that they occurred. All that historians can do is
show what probably happened in the past."26 N.T. Wright sees
the biblical historian as one who is, "looking... at evidence
about the past, trying to reconstruct the probable course of
events... defending such reconstructions.... on the scientific
grounds of getting in the data, doing so with appropriate simplicity, and shedding light on other areas of research."27 Marcus Borg discusses how empirical verification has become a
staple of the modern worldview, forcing one to reduce truth,
"to factuality, either scientifically verifiable or historically reliable facts."28 Ernst Renan, arguing that the lack of modern
day miracles should cause great doubt that biblical miracles
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occurred states that, "If it is proved that no contemporary miracle will bear inquiry, is it not probable that the miracles of the
past... would equally present their share of illusion, if it were
possible to criticise them in detail?"29 As we can see from a
brief survey of prominent biblical historians, the common hermeneutic in analyzing texts and their historical truth claims is
to gather data, see what is verifiable, and then to express what
is probable, possible, or unlikely to have occurred. This is exactly what the Jesus Seminar of the 1980s and 1990s set out to
do, organizing Jesus' statements by whether they believed Jesus said something like what was written down, probably said
what was written, did not say what was written but contains
his ideas, or did not say the passage and the passage does not
come from Jesus' tradition. Biblical historians follow this approach because we are captives of this worldview, as Borg
says, "like all worldviews, it functions in our minds almost unconsciously, affecting what we think possible and what we pay
attention to."30
While not outright rejecting the use the of probabilistic reasoning and empirical verification to assess the veracity
of biblical truth claims, Borg does claim that this approach
should certainly not be the exclusive way of assessing the truth
of the bible. As he states, "I realized that there are well-authenticated experiences that radically transcend what the modern
worldview can accommodate. I became aware that the modern
worldview is itself a cultural construction, the product of a particular era in human intellectual history."31 This is evident in
his explanation of the truth of the post-Easter Jesus:
the truth of Easter itself, does not depending upon
their [Easter stories] being literally and historically
29
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factual. For me, the historical ground of Easter is very
simple: the followers of Jesus, both then and now,
continued to experience Jesus as a living reality after
his death... Those experiences have taken a variety of
forms. They include dramatic forms such as visions
and mystical experiences, and less dramatic forms
such as a sense of the presence of Jesus... The truth of
Easter is grounded in these experiences, not in what
happened (or didn't happen) on a particular Sunday almost two thousand years ago.32
Borg believes that this truth about Easter can be verified
through different people's experiences, but not through some
historical or scientific verification. He does not necessarily believe in the physical resurrection of Jesus, but still accepts that
dramatic visions or mystical experiences of Jesus are an expression of the truth: "I think visions and apparitions can be
true, by which I mean truthful disclosures of the way things
are. I do not put them in the category of hallucinations."33 I
agree with Borg that these are experiences that could not be
empirically verified with our five senses, or as Borg says,
would not be caught on a video camera.34 But Borg delineates
between visions, which are truthful disclosures of the way
things are, and hallucinations, which are not truthful disclosures of the way things are. So while he initially may seem to
avoid issues of historical accuracy, and thus his arguments
would not able to be evaluated by something like Bayes' theorem, he still must discern between whether a particular experience is a vision or hallucination. By making this distinguishment, Borg opens the door for questioning the validity of
someone's experience. How should we question the validity of
32
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someone's experience? Do we assess the credibility of the individual who had the experience, and see whether the truth experienced lines up with other evidence we have? See how this
is no different than what we did in the case study about Hume
and miracles. So while Borg successfully posits that certain
experiences cannot be evaluated through the five senses (or
cannot be seen by a video camera), he is still in a sense stuck
in the modern worldview by having to distinguish between the
truth of certain dramatic experiences.
If we are still left in a situation where there must be
some way to analyze the truthfulness of certain experiences or
events in the bible, what should that standard be? In suggesting
how we can see if it is possible that Jesus could have raised an
individual from the dead (or been himself physically resurrected), Renan posits that a modern day thaumaturgus would
need to prove that resurrection is indeed possible, and the
power is to resurrect is vested within certain individuals:
A commission... would be named. This commission
would choose a corpse, would assure itself that the
death was real... If, under such conditions, the resurrection were effected, a probability almost equal to
certainty would be established. As, however, it ought
to be possible always to repeat an experiment... the
thaumaturgus would be invited to reproduce his marvelous act under other circumstances.35
For all the modern day thaumaturgi reading this, (after all, you
are my target audience) the bar has not been set low. Wright
describes this sort of approach to verifying biblical stories: "It
is proposed that the way to study Jesus is to break the material
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down into its component parts and to evaluate these on the basis of certain rules."36 In this case the relevant parts are resurrection stories, and the rule is, can resurrections be proved via
the scientific method? Wright offers a different method that he
still describes as, "the scientific method of hypothesis and verification,"37 but yet looks nothing like what Renan describes
above.
The researcher, after a period of total and sometimes
confusing immersion in the data, emerges with a hypothesis, a big picture of how everything fits together... it is tested against three criteria: Does it make
sense of the data as they stand? Does it have an appropriate level of simplicity, or even elegance? Does it
shed light on areas of research other than the one it
was designed to cover?38
Wright notes that within biblical studies there is no universally
agreed upon way to decide what gets to count as appropriate
answers and evidence for these questions. This is certainly the
subject of much debate. For the purpose of this paper, see how
the answers to Wright's first question in particular invite the
sorts of probabilistic language used in the discussion of Hume
and miracles. As Wright notes, the data does not always present a coherent picture.39 So pieces of data must be weighed
against one another. This comes to light when the biblical historian tries to piece together the relationship between the four
gospels: when was each written, which gospel copied from
which other gospel, and what other sources were used? Wright
describes how
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Mutually incompatible theories abound as to where,
when, and why the synoptic gospels came to final
form. Since there is no agreement about sources, there
is no agreement as to how and why the different evangelists used them. If, for instance, we believe that Matthew used Mark, we can discuss Matthew's theology
on the basis of his editing of Mark. If we don't believe
Matthew used Mark, we can't.40
These arguments quickly become about if-then statements, or
probabilities of occurrence: regardless of whether of one's definition of a scientific method for historical analysis lines up
with Renan or Wright, logical and mathematical reasoning becomes crucial in order to understand the arguments at hand.
From this survey of important biblical historians and
scholars, we can conclude that mathematical language and
probabilistic reasoning have an important role to play in ascertaining the truth, however one wishes to define it, of biblical
narratives. Biblical historians' work is replete with argumentation that utilizes probabilistic reasoning, and is thus able to
be analyzed through techniques such as Bayes' theorem. This
means that to be able to assess the quality of arguments of philosophers, theologians, and historians, a degree of mathematical literacy may be required. I will now conclude with a story
of how a bit of mathematical intuition may be helpful beyond
the realm of biblical studies and miracles. Consider the story
of Stanislav Petrov, former officer in the Soviet Air Defense
Force, known as "the man who saved the world" from nuclear
war in 1983. Petrov was in charge of monitoring the Soviet
satellites that were supposed to tell the Air Defense Force
when an American ballistic missile was in the air. At this time
the Soviet Union was on high alert, as they had recently shot
down a civilian airliner, killing 269 people on board, including
62 Americans (among them was a sitting U.S. congressman).
40
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Fearing retaliation, one day Petrov's radar screen showed five
missiles had been launched by the U.S. towards the Soviet Union. Petrov claimed he had a "gut instinct,"41 that this was a
false alarm. Petrov noted that it would be odd for the U.S. to
launch a strike, but to only send five missiles, instead of sending a salvo of hundreds. And while the satellites were certainly
set up to prevent a false alarm, Petrov recognized that there
was still the possibility for failure. Needing to make a decision
fast, Petrov decided to not inform his superiors that missiles
were on the way; only when sufficient time had passed and no
missiles hit the Soviet Union did Petrov know he had made the
right call. While Petrov most certainly was not frantically
scribbling out Bayes' Theorem, his intuition lines up with the
mathematical logic of conditional probability. Petrov's prior
knowledge was that the chance that the U.S. would launch a
strike was low, and if they did, they would most likely launch
hundreds of missiles at once, not five. Petrov then had to update his knowledge based on new information: he saw five
missiles on his radar. The question, expressed using Bayesian
conditional probabilities: what is the probability the Americans are beginning a missile attack on the Soviet Union, given
that the radar is showing five missiles coming towards the Soviet Union on the screen? This is the same question that Hume
asks, only instead of in the realm of miracles, it was in the
realm of nuclear defense. Given this, perhaps Thomas Bayes
should also get the moniker, the man who saved the world?
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